Bringing dependency back in: the economic crisis in post-socialist Europe and the continued relevance of dependent development by Vliegenthart, Arjan
www.ssoar.info
Bringing dependency back in: the economic
crisis in post-socialist Europe and the continued
relevance of dependent development
Vliegenthart, Arjan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Vliegenthart, A. (2010). Bringing dependency back in: the economic crisis in post-socialist Europe and the continued
relevance of dependent development. Historical Social Research, 35(2), 242-265. https://doi.org/10.12759/
hsr.35.2010.2.242-265
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-310405
Historical Social Research, Vol. 35 — 2010 — No. 2, 242-265 
Bringing Dependency Back In: 
The Economic Crisis in Post-socialist Europe and the 
Continued Relevance of Dependent Development 
Arjan Vliegenthart ∗ 
Abstract: »Bringing Dependency Back In: Die ökonomische Krise im post-
sozialistischen Europa und die fortgesetzte Relevanz abhängiger Entwick-
lung«. The current economic crisis constitutes an important test for the 
European Union as a whole and its new member states in particular. Whereas 
EU membership of the Central European countries is generally considered to 
mark the end of their period of economic and political transition, the current 
economic hardships might serve as a crucial test for this proposition. This 
paper takes two often forgotten theoretical paradigms to study the current 
developments in Central Europe: dependency theory and World System 
Theory. More in particular, the paper seeks to establish the relevance of the 
concept of the semi-periphery to the current Central European states. 
It concludes that the region has retained its historical position as Europe’s 
semi-periphery, where the hierarchy between the centre and the periphery is 
primarily shaped through the involvement of transnational corporations that 
have their headquarters in Western Europe with subsidiaries in Central Europe. 
This has had important repercussions for economic development in this region, 
as the countries have no control over the commending heights of their 
economy, a development of which the consequences are now becoming 
increasingly clear. 
Keywords: dependent development, world system theory, post-socialist states, 
Visegrad Four, financial crises. 
1. Introduction 
As the economic crisis hit Europe, it did not stop short of those economies that 
were, until quite recently, regarded as examples of successful post-socialist 
development: the new EU member states of Central Europe. Whereas the 
region at the moment shows a quite diverse picture in terms of growth rates, 
their forecasts are quite gloomy, as contracting credit markets and mounting 
bad debts could plunge the whole region into a deep recession (Financial 
Times, 16 May 2009, 7). With these dark economic predictions, discussions 
concerning structural problems of a region that was until recently seen as a 
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forerunner in sound economic policies, are revitalised. To a great extent these 
discussions are related to an inherent vulnerability of the region as a result of 
its dependency on foreign capital. Since the mid 1990s, the region has been on 
a capital infuse with transnational corporations (TNCs) investing great sums 
into these emerging market economies. This has been especially the case in the 
banking scene in the region, which is currently dominated by foreign banks. 
Whereas since the mid 1990s foreign investments have been considered to 
be the driving force behind the economic success story of the region, its 
dependency on foreign capital is now turning out to be the Achilles’ heel of 
their economic system. With financial sources drying out in Western Europe, 
discussions on the desirability of this kind of dependency are revisited. 
The developments come as a surprise to many scholars of the region. The 
general impression that can be derived from the literature is that the new EU 
member states are in a process of catching up with the more advanced 
economies of Western Europe. During the first half of the 1990s there have 
been debates on the political and economic consequences of a possible foreign 
led model of economic development. However, as time passed, the influx of 
FDI was combined with considerable annual growth rates and the debate has 
dried out, both empirically and normatively. Although there is some recent 
work from various theoretical perspectives that challenge this orthodoxy (see 
for instance Bohle 2004, Holman 2004, Bohle and Greskovits 2006, 2007, 
Böröcz 2004, Shields 2003, 2004, Drahokoupil 2008, 2009a and b) the general 
impression is implicitly or explicitly inspired by modernist notions of 
development. Whereas the current literature acknowledges the ties that bind the 
region to the rest of the world economy, most studies do nothing more than 
conclude that the region enjoyed immense flows of FDI, particularly since the 
end of the 1990s and that the increasing interconnectedness of the region with 
the rest of the world has benefited the region greatly (see for instance Hanson 
for the general argument, Hunya 2000 for post-socialist Europe, and Goldberg 
2007 for the financial sector in particular). 
With a special focus on the current crisis, this paper revisits the role of 
foreign capital in the region. It does so by taking up a theoretical approach that 
has largely disappeared from the debates on the position of post-socialist 
Europe in the world economy: dependency theory and World System Theory 
and, in particular, the concept of the semi-periphery. These two theoretical 
perspectives, which have a lot in common, have been developed to capture the 
problems that states outside the core economies face in their economic 
development. Especially World System Theory has made strong claims with 
regard to the economic trajectories for countries that belong neither to the 
richest nor the poorest states in the world. We revisit these theoretical 
perspectives and aim to identify the merits of such approaches. To what extent 
can they further our understanding of the current economic problems in post-
socialist Europe and the position of the region in the world economy? The 
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answer to this question would make an important contribution to the literature 
in two ways. First, it could revitalise some of the leading theories on economic 
development in the context of post-socialist Europe. The economic crisis in 
post-socialist Europe constitutes a crucial case for this perspective in the sense 
that it makes the social arrangements that are key within the dependency 
literature most visible. On the other hand, if the theory is not able to provide a 
convincing account for the current developments, this poses serious challenges 
to some of its core assumptions (following Yin 1984). Second, the answer can 
cast new light on the path of economic development upon which the post-
socialist European states have embarked. The current crisis poses important 
challenges to economic development in the region and insights from a 
dependency theory perspective might be able to point at some of the major 
obstacles for further, sustainable, development (following Chase-Dunn 1975). 
In its empirical evidence, the paper focuses on the four countries that 
constitute the Visegrad group: the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. In these countries, which are widely seen as the most advanced post-
socialist states, the period of “transition” has come to an end. They are well 
integrated in the world economy, albeit in a subordinate position (Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009). Consequently, the region has been regularly typified as 
semi-peripheral (see also Böröcz 1992, 2004, Roncevic 2002, Gáspár and 
Nováky 2002). The region therefore constitutes a legitimate testing ground for 
the claims made by the dependency theory and World System Theory on semi-
peripheral development. This paper pays particular attention to the banking 
sector for three reasons. First, banks play a vital role in the allocation of 
financial resources within an economy, which has important repercussions for 
the economy as a whole. Second, the financial sector has been the segment of 
the economy that has been most deeply penetrated by foreign capital. Third, 
since the current crisis began as a financial crisis, the consequences of the crisis 
are the most tangible in this sector. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section two we will 
discuss the key concepts of the dependency literature. We will pay particular 
attention to the concept of the semi-periphery, the idea of dependent 
development, the merits of the so-called Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 
literature and the notion of the comprador class. In section three we will then 
apply these concepts and contributions to the context of post-socialist Europe. 
We will argue that the economic structure of the region can best be captured 
under the heading of the semi-periphery, as these countries are dependent 
market economies, where economic development has been intrinsically tied to 
Western capital that has entered the region since the mid 1990s. In section four 
we will then turn to the current economic and financial crisis and discuss its 
repercussions for the region. Here we will also pay attention to the political 
discussions on the possible European support for the region. We observe that 
parts of the European financial sector have become so intertwined with the 
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future of the region that this debate has become truly transnational. Section five 
provides a conclusion of our arguments. 
2. Dependency theory and World System Theory revisited 
The origin of dependency theory lies in the discussion of the underdevelopment 
of the Third World at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. Its genesis is 
generally considered to be a reaction to the modernisation school (e.g. Rostow 
1960), which argues that there is a linear process of development through 
which all economies in the world pass. Economic differences therefore are 
primarily related to the position of individual economies on the ladder of 
economic development. Each country in this respect has a common path to 
follow and late-comers are able to catch up with front-runners as long as they 
implement the right economic policies. Rather than adhering to such ideas, 
dependency theorists seek to understand the structural reasons for 
underdevelopment in the world’s economic periphery as well as the 
hierarchical structure of the world economy. Although there is substantial 
variation within the academic work that builds on dependency theory, two main 
common building blocks can be identified. First, there is the argument that the 
world can only be adequately understood in the context of global capitalism. 
Second, the theory departs from the notion that a separation between the 
economic and political realm is not only ontologically incorrect, but also 
hinders a thorough understanding of the functioning of today’s world. Hence, 
dependency theory seeks to provide a holistic picture that pays particular 
attention to the interplay between economic and political developments.  
Building on the work of dependency theorists of the 1960s, the 1970s saw 
the rise of an adjacent perspective, the World System Theory (WST) (Kay 
2005). Pioneering work in this respect has been done by Immanuel Wallerstein, 
who in an attempt to create historical sociology of global capitalism came up 
with the concept of a world system that is the primary departing point for the 
analysis of social, economic and political phenomena. A world system is an 
autonomous system that can be defined by a set of dynamic relations between 
the various elements of the system and can be divided in three different 
categories: the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery. 
The concept of the semi-periphery is probably one of the most discussed 
concepts of the World System Theory. To some the concept is amongst the 
most valuable contributions of WST (Peschard undated), whereas others have 
fiercely criticised the concept on both theoretical and methodological grounds 
(Lange 1985). Its point of departure is the empirical observation that a group of 
states neither fit the categorisation of core states nor the label periphery in 
terms of economic development (Radice 2009). What characterises the 
economy of these semi-periphal states are two major features. First, the semi-
periphery in this respect combines elements of both the centre and the 
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periphery. Semi-peripheral states have their own manufacturing industries that 
reflect a predominance of activities at the intermediate levels with regard to the 
current world-system distribution of capital intensive / labour intensive 
production (Chase-Dunn 1998, 212). In this respect, the semi-periphery has its 
particular position in the so-called global commodity chain, a linked set of 
processes that transform a raw good into a consumable item. Its relatively 
vibrant industrial base is to provide a source of cheap labor that counteracts 
upward pressures on wages in the core and, at the same time, provides a new 
location for the ‘declining’ industries that can no longer function profitably in 
the advanced economies, mainly as a result of too high wage costs. During the 
development of WST, these industries most notably included steel or textile 
production, but the particular goods change over time (Wallerstein 1985, 33).  
Second, economic development – that indeed occurs in the semi-periphery – 
is related to capital brought into the semi-periphery from core economies. This 
notion of ‘dependent development’, which was first systemically theorised by 
Gereffi and Evans (1981), is of crucial importance in order to understand the 
economic trajectories of semi-peripheral states; it is therefore good to quote 
Gereffi and Evans at some greater length in order to capture meaning of 
‘dependent development’. 
This process of development in the contemporary period has been labelled 
“dependent development”: “development” because it is characterized by 
capital accumulation and an increasingly complex differentiation of the 
internal productive structure, “dependent” because it is indelibly marked by 
the effects of continued dependence on capital housed in the current core 
countries (Gereffi and Evans 1981, 31-32). 
In their study of Mexico and Brazil, Gereffi and Evans point to the 
importance of transnational corporations and foreign direct investments (FDI) 
that fuel the internal economies of these two countries to the extent that they 
were able to move away from the periphery of the world economy. At the same 
time, semi-peripheral states are particularly prone to external imbalances that 
constitute ‘a chronic problem’ (idem: 57). 
More recently, many of the notions brought forward within the framework 
of the dependency school have been worked out empirically in the so-called 
Global Commodity Chains literature (GCC) that focuses not only on the 
process in which raw materials are transformed into final goods, but also on the 
web of social relations that connects productive activities (Bair 2005, 154-155).  
One of main findings in this respect is the important role that transnational 
corporations play in the appropriation of value that is consequently led back to 
the countries in the core economies, leaving countries in the semi-periphery 
only limited control of the long term strategic choices with regard to the nature 
of production (Smith et al. 2002). At the same time, whereas the GCC literature 
in the context of a globalising world confirms many of the assumptions of the 
dependency school, the GCC literature also points to considerable variation 
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amongst the different regions of the semi-periphery (Clancy 1998, 124, see also 
Whitley 1999). Here it is of importance to stress the fact that every core tends 
to have its own semi-periphery to which products that are no longer profitably 
produced in the core are outsourced. In the context of post-socialist Europe, 
which we will turn to in the next section, it is the core economies of Western 
Europe that are most closely tied to the dependent development of the region, 
both politically and economically. 
Politically, the comprador class is the primary group of actors that articulate 
the interests of foreign capital in the semi-periphery. Paul Baran (1957) in his 
Political Economy of Growth was among the first to use this notion, followed 
by André Gunder Frank in his work on the development of underdevelopment 
in South America (1967). The comprador class refers to those fractions of the 
bourgeoisie in Third World societies whose interests, by virtue of their specific 
role as middlemen in the import and export business, are intimately tied to 
those of foreign capital. Normally, the comprador bourgeoisie is contrasted 
with the national bourgeoisie, a distinction that was first introduced by Nicos 
Poulantzas (1973). The comprador fraction, argued Poulantzas, does not have 
its own base for capital accumulation but  
is that fraction of the [bourgeois, AV] class whose interests are constitutively 
linked to foreign imperialist capital (capital belonging to the principal foreign 
imperialist power) and which is thus completely bound politically and 
ideologically to foreign capital (Poulantzas 1973, 39). 
Hence, in the Poulantzian sense the comprador fraction is to be discerned 
from other fractions of the bourgeoisie in that it does not directly possess any 
significant means of production itself; and its wealth does not result directly 
from the appropriation of surplus value in the process of production. 
3. Post-socialist Europe as part of the semi-periphery 
To what extent does the concept of the semi-periphery hold for the Central 
European context? In this section, we trace the features of the semi-periphery 
discussed above, focusing on the critical concepts of dependent development 
and its political manifestation in the form of the comprador class. As King 
(1999) has pointed out, the debate between modernists and neoclassical 
economists, on the one hand, and adherents of the dependency school and 
WST, on the other, entered the scene after the collapse of state socialism. 
Whereas this debate between the modernisation school and dependency 
theory had initially focused on Third World countries, the collapse of state 
socialism in Central and Eastern Europe and the subsequent transformation of 
the countries in the region towards a capitalist market economy raised 
important questions regarding the role of foreign capital and the future position 
of what used to be the Second World in rapidly globalising world economy. 
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However, as the first decade of economic transformation passed, the 
modernist or neoclassical approach seemed to have become dominant in 
explaining the developments, while the dependency school seems to have 
disappeared from the scenery. Substantial growth rates and the upward 
economic mobility of parts of the former Soviet bloc fuelled the notion that 
post-socialist Europe was going through a period of transition, at the end of 
which a full and equal integration in the world economy, the transatlantic 
security community and the European political project would be reached. IMF, 
NATO and EU membership were in this respect considered to be landmarks in 
a process that came to a close in the first half of the 2000s. It is therefore no 
surprise that already in 1995, Adrian Smith concluded that: 
Attempts to conceptualize “the transition to capitalism” in central and eastern 
Europe have been dominated by modernization accounts of a unilinear process 
by which one coherent system based upon the Plan is replaced by a successive 
system based on the market and private property relations (Smith 1995, 761). 
At the same time, the importance of foreign capital for the economic 
development of the region is widely acknowledged. Far less attention, 
however, is paid to the distributional and political repercussions of a situation 
in which key decisions with regard to economic development are no longer 
taken within the region itself. Rather, most literature points out that FDI has led 
to superior performance of economy of Central Europe, especially compared to 
countries further east that have not embarked upon the path of democratisation 
and liberalisation. Such arguments are backed by statistical evidence that – 
after a fierce back drop in the early 1990s – demonstrates economic develop-
ment or, somewhat more precise, economic growth since the second half of the 
1990s, as table 1 also demonstrates. 
Table 1: Economic development in Visegrad Four 
Year/ Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Slovak 
Republic 
1990 100 100 100 100 
1994 90 88 103 80 
1999 100 104 137 101 
2003 113 125 155 116 
2007 141 144 191 155 
Source: WDI, Quick Query, own calculations. 
Economic Development measured as GDP growth per capita. 
 
This paper does not contest the fact that the region has indeed known strong 
economic development since the second half of the 1990s. Also in comparison 
to advanced capitalist economies, economic growth rates in Central Europe 
have been above average in the OECD world. There is even some evidence of 
upward mobility, as we might conclude from table 2. This is, however, not 
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necessarily in contradiction to the position of the region as part of the semi-
periphery. Rather, upward and downward mobility is often identified as one of 
the main characteristics of this part of the world system (Wallerstein 1985, 35, 
Chase-Dunn 1975). 
Table 2: Visegrad Four vis-à-vis high income countries 
Year/ Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Slovak 
Republic 
1990 0,6 0,5 0,3 0,4 
1994 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,4 
1999 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,4 
2003 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,4 
2007 0,7 0,5 0,5 0,6 
Source: WDI, Quick Quey, own calculations. 
GDP per capita in Visegrad Four compared to GDP per capita of high income countries. 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, the semi-periphery combines features 
of both core and periphery, thereby taking a middling location within this 
global hierarchy (Shannon 1996, 32-39, Wallerstein 2000, 86-89). As we will 
demonstrate in this section, the economic structures of the region embody key 
elements of the semi-periphery, as discussed in the previous section.  
Historically speaking, the region has been in this position for over a few 
centuries. The heavy dependency on foreign capital is, for instance, not a new 
phenomenon in East Central Europe; it has been a recurring theme since the 
start of its industrialization process in the second half of the 19th century. From 
this time onwards, crucial economic sectors have been dominated and 
controlled by foreign capital and, more specifically, foreign banks. Foreign 
capital has played a decisive role in building a modern infrastructure and 
banking system as well as major elements of economic modernization. Thus, at 
the end of the 19th century more than 50 per cent of all banks and government 
debts in Hungary were in foreign hands (Berend and Ránki 1974, 101-102), a 
tendency that was disrupted during the communist period only to reappear in 
greater scale after the demise of state socialism. Characteristically, the origin of 
foreign capital nowadays does not fundamentally differ from that during the 
19th century. German and Austrian (and, to a more limited degree, Italian) 
capital dominated the financial scene in ECE in the 19th century as they do 
now.  
The postwar period in this respect showed a remarkable shift in geopolitical 
terms, but also stability of its financial dependency. During the communist era, 
the region moved into a position of ‘dual dependency’ (Böröcz 1992), in which 
it was geopolitically subordinate to the USSR and increasingly economically 
dependent on western capital, especially after 1970. In this respect, dependency 
on capital from Western Europe has been key to economic development in East 
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Central Europe ever since the region departed from feudalism. This has been 
no different since the collapse of state socialism at the end of the 1980s. Since 
then, foreign capital has flown into the region. First hesitantly, as the political 
situation in the region remained somewhat uncertain during the early years of 
economic transformation, but since the mid 1990s with ever growing force as 
table 3 demonstrates. 
Table 3: FDI stock in Visegrad Four  
Year/ Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Slovak 
Republic 
1994 10,4 16,6 3,5 5,7 
1999 29,2 47,1 15,5 15,5 
2003 49,6 57,3 26,7 44,2 
2007 58,4 71,1 34,0 51,4 
Source: Unctad, FDI indicators. 
FDI stock measured as percentage of GDP. 
 
It is important, however, to take a closer look at the kind of economic 
activities to which the FDI flows have gone. Here we find that foreign capital 
has primarily sought to penetrate the industrial sectors that are oriented towards 
the production of durable consumer goods for Western European markets (see 
table 4, Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). Typical examples for these industries 
today include car assembly and consumer electronics, although a rigid 
perspective of sectors as a whole would distract our attention from the fact that 
the semi-periphery does not harbour the full business cycle, but rather focuses 
on the production segment. The more profitable stages such as branding and 
marketing are situated in the core economies, an argument that has been made 
most prominently by the GCC Commodity Chain literature (for an application 
on Eastern Europe see Caban and Henderson 2003). Thus, the economic gain 
for the semi-periphery remains limited (see also Perry 2009 for a general 
argument). 
Table 4: Share of foreign ownership in four strategic sectors 
Country/ Sectors Automotive Manufacturing Electronics 
Czech Republic 93,1 52,6 74,8 
Hungary 93,2 60,3 92,2 
Poland 90,8 45,2 70,3 
Slovak Republic 97,3 68,5 79,0 
Sources: For 2004 based on OECD.stat database measured as a percentage of turnover. 
 
Equally important is the high level of foreign capital in the banking sector. 
The banking sector is of great importance in any capitalist economy, but 
especially so in those that go through a process of profound restructuring. In 
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the context of post-socialist Central Europe, banks are the primary allocators of 
investments and therefore have a strong influence on the kind of economic 
activities that are promoted. As table 5 points out, the market shares of foreign 
branches and subsidiaries in the Euro area amounted to a mere 15.5% at the 
end of 2004, in comparison to well over 70% in the ECE economies (see also 
Raviv 2008, 168-170, King 2007, 310). Since the second half of the 1990s 
foreign banks have invested heavily in the region, primarily through take-overs 
of domestic rather than green field investments. Consequently, most of the 
largest banks in the region are now in foreign hands – see table 6. It is however 
also worthwhile to note that state ownership has not disappeared completely in 
the region. In Poland and Hungary, two of the leading banks are still under 
state control. 
Table 5: Foreign ownership in banking sector in Visegrad Four 
Year/ Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Slovak 
Republic 
1998 28,1 62,5 17,4 33,4 
2000 72,1 70,1 72,6 42,1 
2002 85,8 90,7 70,9 95,6 
2004 94,8 80,4 67,6 96,7 
2007 96,4 84,5 66,9 97,4 
Sources: Mérö and Valentiny (2003: 35-38), Raiffeisen Research (2008). 
Foreign bank assets measured as percentage of commercial bank assets. 
Table 6: Largest banks in Central Europe 
Bank Country Total Assets (millions euro) 
Largest 
Shareholder 
Bank Pekao Poland 34,304 UniCredit 
Ceska Sporitelna Czech Republic 30,573 Erste Bank 
PKO Banka Polski Poland 30,083 Polish State 
Ceskoslovenská obchodní Banka Czech Republic 27,847 KBC 
Komercni Banka Czech Republic 24,974 Societé Généralee 
OTP Bank Hungary 24,912 Hungarian State 
Banka Comerciala Romana Romania 17,562 Erste Bank 
BRE Bank Poland 15,512 Commerzbank AG 
ING Slaski Poland 14,415 ING 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka Slovenia 14,166 Slovenian State 
Source: Raiffeisen Research (2008). 
 
Consequently, foreign capital has had a serious impact on the socio-
economic set-up of the region. The leading socio-economic institutions – as 
discussed within the Varieties of Capitalism literature (see for instance Hall 
and Soskice 2001) – are all co-shaped by the vital importance of FDI to 
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economic development in post-socialist Europe. This is most keenly true for 
the Visegrad Four where institutional development has led to a configuration 
that neither resembles the traditional Rhineland model, nor the Anglo-Saxon 
type of capitalism. Rather, it has its own institutional configuration and, what is 
more, its own comparative advantages in the production of durable consumer 
goods, i.e. predominantly in the automotive and chemical industry, leading to a 
model that we can rightfully call a Dependent Market Economy (see Nölke and 
Vliegenthart 2009 for an extended argument on Dependent Market Economies 
in post-socialist Europe, see also table 7). This comparative advantage basically 
rests upon the combination of relatively well-educated work forces and low 
wages compared to the economies of the core. In contrast to these established 
market economies, the intra-firm hierarchies within transnational corporations 
play a crucial role in the organisation of the economy. Also in the field of 
corporate governance, transnational corporations play a vital role as 
headquarters control local subsidiaries rather than capital markets or a system 
of internal supervision via Supervisory Boards. Equally, when it comes to 
governmental policies in the field of education and industrial relations, policies 
are shaped to provide transnational firms with flexibility via company-level 
collective agreements and an educational system that is relatively low-cost, yet 
capable of providing the labour force with the basic qualifications needed for 
the continuation of the existing comparative advantage. 
The characterisation of Visegrad Four as a Dependent Market Economy 
neatly fits within the framework of dependent development as discussed in the 
previous section. In this respect we find the post-socialist economies have 
reached an admittedly rather fragile equilibrium that allows for a distinct kind 
of economic development intrinsically rooted within an international division 
of labour. The stability of this equilibrium depends not only on internal 
developments but rather, as we shall see in the next section, can be greatly 
shaped by those abroad. At the same time, policy makers in the region might 
also be tempted to move beyond the existing status in an attempt to enter the 
core of the world economy – a path that is neither easy nor straightforward, as 
it would be necessary to move beyond the existing comparative advantages 
without directly having an alternative to embark upon. 
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Table 7: Post-socialist Capitalism in Visegrad Four in comparative 
Institution/ Variety 
Liberal Market 
Economies (US, 
UK) 
Coordinated 
Market Economies 
(Germany, Austria) 
Dependent Market 
Economies 
(Visegrad Four) 
Distinctive coordination 
mechanism 
Competitive 
markets and formal 
contracts 
Inter-firm networks 
and associations 
Dependence on 
intra-firm 
hierarchies within 
transnational 
enterprises 
Primary means of raising 
investments 
Domestic and 
international capital 
markets 
Domestic bank 
lending and 
internally generated 
funds 
Foreign direct 
investments and 
foreign-owned 
banks 
Corporate governance 
Outsider control: 
dispersed 
shareholders 
Insider control: 
concentrated 
shareholders 
Control by 
headquarters of 
transnational 
enterprises 
Industrial relations 
Pluralist, market-
based, almost no 
collective 
agreements 
Corporatist, rather 
consensual, sector-
wide or even 
national agreements 
Appeasement of 
skilled labor, 
company level 
collective 
agreements 
Education and training 
system 
General skills, high 
research and 
development 
expenditures 
Company- or 
industry-specific 
skills, vocational 
training 
Limited 
expenditures for 
further qualification 
Transfer of innovations 
Based on markets 
and formal 
contracts 
Important role of 
joint ventures and 
business 
associations 
Intra-firm transfer 
within transnational 
enterprise 
Comparative advantages 
Radical innovation 
in technology and 
service sectors 
Incremental 
innovation of 
capital goods 
Assembly platforms 
for semi-
standardized 
industrial goods 
Source: Table taken from Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). 
 
Adding further flesh to these bones of macro-economic data and socio-
economic set-up of the region, there are studies that are conducted from a GCC 
perspective (amongst others Czaban and Henderson 1998 and 2003, Smith et 
al. 2002, Pickles et al. 2006). These studies, on the one hand, point to the 
importance of the state socialist legacy in the way in which the relations 
between the region and transnational capital are shaped. The transformation 
towards a market economy has been primarily a process on the ruins of state 
socialism (Stark and Bruszt 1998), rather than a process that has been designed 
and implemented out of the blue. On the other hand, GCC scholars point to a 
range of paths that countries and sectors have embarked upon in order to meet 
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the pressures of international competition. Here we find that “restructuring of 
production in western European countries through outsourcing parts of the 
production process to relatively low-cost wage areas (amongst other places) in 
central and eastern Europe” (Hudson 2001, 13) has been one of the most 
frequent strategies of transnational corporations facing downward pressures on 
their profit rates in Western Europe and elsewhere. Whereas these 
developments were to a large extent exogenous to the region and rather the 
result of long-term overaccumulation (Harvey 2003, 149), the coincidence of 
the collapse of communism with US hegemony and its preferences for 
privatization and radical liberalisation, as well as its timing under the condition 
of advanced financialisation, has contributed to the particularly intensive 
restructuring of ownership in East Central Europe as well as to the 
overwhelming dominance of Western capital within these DMEs (see also 
Vliegenthart and Overbeek 2007 and Raviv 2008). 
Politically speaking, this kind of dependent development has been strongly 
promoted by subsequent Central European governments regardless of the 
political colour (Vliegenthart 2009, Drahokoupil 2009a). Leading in this 
respect has been a comprador class in the Poulantzian sense of the word 
composed of the internal service sector such as consultants and advisors 
(Vliegenthart and Overbeek 2007 and Drahokoupil 2009b). In contrast to other 
semi-peripheral regions that have been analysed under the framework of WST, 
there has hardly been a serious rival to the comprador class, as a domestic 
bourgeoisie has largely been absent. This can, for the most part, be explained 
by the distinct history of the region. The ECE capitalist class that had been 
developing during the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century was 
suppressed during the state socialist era. Correspondingly, following the 
breakdown of the communist rule, a domestic bourgeoisie was lacking and 
western capital streamed into the region without much opposition, leading to a 
type of capitalism that has been labeled ‘capitalism without capitalists’ (Eyal et 
al. 1998). 
This is not to say that this process has gone uncontested. On the contrary, 
the process has been prone the serious political discussions since its beginning. 
During the early 1990s, most governments in the region, with the exception 
of Hungary, were rather reluctant to sell vital parts of their economy to foreign 
investors. Important sectors remained in state hands as politicians considered 
the sector to be of too great strategic importance to sell it off quickly. 
Opponents of foreign led privatisation of the banking sector as well as the 
sale of domestic banks to foreign ones received great support from the 
population in the region (Sinn and Weichenrieder 1997). This changed 
however around the mid 1990s, when an economic crisis in the region and the 
prospect of EU membership paved the way for different strategies. With the 
EU pressing for a level playing field and the unconditional access of capital for 
the entire economy, governments adopted a more foreign investor-friendly 
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policy. At the same time, transnational corporations became increasingly eager 
to enter the region after the first years of economic restructuring had passed. 
The different countries showed considerable determination to complete their 
paths to a free market economy. Consequently, foreign investments exploded 
and although large and controversial foreign take-overs were always met with 
some political resistance, policies were not radically adjusted, as governments 
kept a close eye on reaching EU membership as quickly as possible. 
4. Dependent development and its repercussions in the 
current crisis – a first assessment 
The fact that this process of dependent development was able to enforce itself 
might be understandable in light of the economic growth the countries have 
enjoyed since the mid 1990s, but with the current crisis it becomes 
questionable to what extent this strategy remains economically and politically 
viable. In this section, we seek to trace its first economic and political 
repercussions of this crisis and the initial reaction of the key actors. 
As Dankse Bank (2009, 1) has pointed out in a recent survey of the region, 
the deepening of the financial sector during the last two decades was primarily 
fuelled by Western banks that invested large sums into the region under the 
premise that asset prices would continue to rise. The excess liquidity that 
existed as a result of overaccumulation in the core economies of Western 
Europe was transferred eastwards. With the outbreak of the financial crisis and 
acute liquidity problems for many transnational banks these inflows ran dry in 
late 2008. This process of capital contraction was sped up by the fact that many 
of the debts in the region are short term. Initially, this manifested itself in a 
rapid increase of the interest rates for short term loans that increased in 
September 2008 to close to 900 b.p. in Hungary, 700 for Poland and around 
500 for the Czech and Slovak Republics, indicating that liquidity was 
becoming scarce and risk premiums for the region were rising (Mideuropa 
2008, 2). 
The drying out of capital inflows is of course not restricted to the financial 
sector, but is typical for the entire economy, as table 8 indicates. 
Table 8: FDI inflow in Central Europe 
Year/ Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Slovak 
Republic 
2007 9,3 6,1 23,0 3,3 
2008 6,5 4,4 21,0 2,4 
2009 3,5 3,2 15,0 1,2 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2008. 
Data measured in $ Bln. 
 256
Compared to 2007, FDI inflows in the Czech Republic and Slovakia have 
been reduced by more than 50 per cent, whereas inflows in Hungary and 
Poland have gone down by more than one third. 
The subsequent economic crisis and the collapse of demand primarily from 
Western Europe aggravated the situation- as table 9 shows. Whereas exports 
had been growing substantially during the 2000s, the economic crisis resulted 
almost immediately in rapidly declining demand for the (consumer) goods 
being produced by the post-socialist European countries. The fact that the 
region had specialised itself in the automotive industry meant that the almost 
complete fall out of demand for new cars contributed substantially to this 
decline in exports. Consequently, industrial production has shrinked rapidly 
since the second half of 2008, as table 10 demonstrates. Whereas initially there 
has been some variation, the smaller countries of the Visegrad four have all 
seen a drop of more than 20 per cent in the first quarter of 2009, with only 
Poland performing better – or less worse – with a drop of slightly more than 10 
per cent. 
Table 9: Export growth in Visegrad Four 
Country/ Period 2008 overall 3Q 2008 4Q 2008 1Q 2009 
Czech Republic 11.3 15.9 -7.7 -23.9 
Hungary 5,2 5.8 -10.8 -26.3 
Poland 11,7 17.8 -9.8 -23.3 
Slovak Republic 13,7 18.0 -2.0 -21.5 
Source: World Bank EU10 Regular Economic Report May 2009. 
Table 10: Industrial production for the Visegrad Four 
Country/ Period 2008 overall 3Q 2008 4Q 2008 1Q 2009 
Czech Republic -2,7 -1,9 -12,8 -20,0 
Hungary -1,0 -1,8 -12,2 -21,6 
Poland 2,3 1,1 -6,0 -11,8 
Slovak Republic 4,4 5,7 -11,1 22,9 
Source: World Bank EU10 Regular Economic Report May 2009. 
 
The consequences of these developments are further amplified by the fact 
that – as table 11 indicates – the currencies of Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Poland have lost considerable value compared to the Euro since the second 
half of 2008. The Czech Crown has lost more than 10 per cent of its worth, 
whereas the Hungarian Forint and the Polish Zloty have lost more than 20 per 
cent. 
Only Slovakia has not suffered from this development, as the Euro replaced 
their own currency as of the first of January 2009. Such a deterioration of the 
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local currency does not constitute a problem per se, in the short term it could 
even spur exports. However, because many of the loans made to Central 
European states were in Euros, the declining exchange rates make it harder to 
pay them off. This has led some to conclude that Eastern Europe is now 
becoming the subprime borrower of Western Europe (<http://mises.org/ 
story/3376>). 
Table 11: Central European currencies vis-à-vis the Euro 
Euro/ local currency Czech Crown Hungarian Forint Polish Zloty 
1 July 2008 23,8 235,9 3,4 
1 October 2008 24,5 242,2 3,4 
1 January 2009 26,9 267,0 4,2 
1 April 27,1 301,9 4,5 
Source:www.xe.com. 
 
Finally, although clear and substantive data on capital outflow are not yet 
available, the risk of large-scale capital repatriation is looming over the 
Visegrad markets. As Financial Times columnist Willem Buiter has pointed out 
early this year, the discussions in the new EU member states on the 
introduction of capital controls might well be an indicator that policy makers in 
the region take this threat increasingly serious (Buiter 2009). If it would indeed 
come to large scale capital repatriation, two of the main ingredients of the 
Asian financial crisis would also apply to the current Central European context 
– namely the combination of currency devaluation and capital flight, which 
would render such a comparison relevant. Some forecasts even go so far as to 
argue that post-socialist Europe might not be in a better position than the Asian 
states in 1998 (BMI 2009). 
In light of these developments, it is not surprising that some Central 
European politicians have called upon the EU to help them overcome the crisis. 
As Jan Drahokoupil points out in his contribution, the Visegrad Four have –
until now – suffered less from the economic crisis than other post-socialist 
states in Europe, such as the Baltic. However, even here there have been clear 
calls for assistance. Especially the Hungarian government, which is not only 
coping with current economic downturn but also with a large budget deficit, 
has called for the help of several international institutions. In October 2008 the 
Hungarian government closed a $25.1bln rescue deal with the IMF, of which 
$8.1bln was paid for by the EU and $1.4bln by the World Bank. 
Simultaneously, the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsany has urged the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to increase their 
activities in the Central European states rather than closing them down, as had 
been planned.  
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However, these flows did not prevent Hungary from slipping into a 
recession. This has led to severe criticism of the EU, especially amongst the 
Hungarian opposition, which has done too little to elevate the Hungarian 
problems. According to opposition leader Orban,  
the way the Western countries handle the crisis is financial protectionism 
against Central Europe… With the nationalization and financial bailout of 
western banks, the Central European financial institutions got into a 
disadvantageous position… (whereas) as long as the (Hungarian) banking 
sector was profitable, they [foreign banks, AV] always put the profit in their 
pocket (Hungarian News Agency, 22 February 2009). 
These calls for support have found resonance with some sections of 
transnational capital. Especially those banks that heavily invested into the 
region have urged the EU to come to the rescue of post-socialist European 
economies. The high involvement of some Western banks in the region has 
made the future prospects of these bank intrinsically tied to those of the region.  
Here it seems that the notion of dependent development is not purely 
restricted to the economies in the region itself but has become extended to 
those segments of transnational capital that, in their flight away from the 
fiercest competition in Western Europe, have put their focus on the new 
members of the EU and their borderlands. In late 2008 the Bayern Landesbank, 
EFG Eurobank, Erste Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo, KBC, Societé Génerale, 
Raiffeissen International, Swedbank and Unicredit formed a lobby group that 
has been pressing the EU and European Central Bank (ECB) to provide Central 
European states, whether EU member or not, with more funds in order to 
overcome their financial problems. 
These banks have made longer-term commitments to the region. This is 
related partly to the orientation of the banks, as they come from Rhineland 
economies rather than Anglo-Saxon ones, but is also a result of the fact that 
profit rates in the region have been higher than in their home countries since 
the mid 1990s. It is precisely those banks that face serious competitive 
disadvantages – of size for instance – in the key markets of Western Europe 
(i.e. Germany, France, the UK) that in the 1990s and early 2000s have turned to 
the new semi-periphery to escape the worst competitive pressures (see also 
table 12). Initially, they have done so with considerable success. In 2001, for 
instance, Austrian banks made 1/3 of their profit in Central Europe, although 
they had invested only ten per cent of their assets there. The IMF reported that 
“margins have consistently been higher and loans losses lower than in mature 
banking markets of Austria” (Financial Times, 29 October 2002, 4). 
Their call has been heard by some of the governments from which these 
banks originally stem. The Austrian government for instance has launched an 
initiative for an aid package to stabilise the emerging European banking sector, 
offering money of its own and urging Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the 
EU to contribute. World Bank President Zoellick also implicitly supported this 
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call, stating that “this is the time for Europe to come together to ensure that the 
achievements of the last twenty years are not lost because of an economic crisis 
that is rapidly turning into a human crisis” (Washington Post, 27 February 
2009). 
Table 12: Most important foreign banks in Visegrad Four 
Presence in Visegrad Four 
Bank Home Country 
Total 
Assets Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland 
Slovak 
Republic 
KBC Belgium 48429 x x x x 
Erste Bank Austria 47300 x x - x 
UniCredit Italy 40809 x x x x 
Raiffeisen Austria 20152 x x x x 
Societé Generale France 15875 x - x - 
Source: Raiffeisen Research (2008), own calculations. 
 
Until now, however, most of the other EU member states have not answered 
this call for assistance. Facing their own problems, they appear to choose firstly 
to support their own national economies, as for instance France and Germany 
have done. The French government under leadership of Sarkozy has opted for a 
strategy that first of all seeks to save French jobs. The German government has 
been equally reluctant to support the region as its own economy, which is 
oriented on exports, has been affected considerably by the crisis. Especially the 
support of the latter is of crucial importance if a rescue plan such as that 
proposed by the Austrian government is to stand a chance. 
The reluctance of many of the core economies of Western Europe to support 
the new member states can only be partly understood in the light of their own 
economic and financial problems. Rather it is an intrinsic element of the EU 
that has never developed any serious social dimension (Bohle 2004). EU 
structural funds have always been oriented toward increasing economic 
competiveness of weaker member states and never as a cushion to soften the 
strongest blows of economic restructuring. In this respect the economic crisis is 
probably going to be a serious blow to the dominant idea that the new EU 
member states are on a unilinear path towards the core of the world economy. 
It reflects the still existing deep division between the old and the new EU 
member states in economic and social terms. At the same time, post-socialist 
Europe is now suffering from its economic orientation. As part of their 
transformation toward a market economy and their desire to enter the EU 
(Vliegenthart and Horn 2007), the countries in the region have introduced 
neoliberal policies that have gone beyond the ones implemented 
simultaneously in Western Europe. As long as neoliberalism was considered to 
be the ultimate remedy for economic success, post-socialist Europe could be 
seen as some kind of promised land in terms of, for instance, fiscal policies (see 
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Vliegenthart and Overbeek 2008). With the current crisis, however, it is 
questionable whether these institutions are indeed apt to overcome the 
problems that have arisen. It might well be that different institutions are more 
apt to overcome the current problems though their introduction might well be a 
painful process. 
5. Conclusion 
So what can we take from this paper? First, notions such as the semi-periphery 
and dependent development have a continued relevance for the post-socialist 
development in Central Europe. For the last two decades, the region has 
retained its historical position as Europe’s semi-periphery, where the hierarchy 
between the centre and the periphery is primarily shaped through the 
involvement of transnational corporations. These corporations have their 
headquarters in Western Europe and subsidiaries in Central Europe, which 
have an important impact upon economic development there. Whereas the 
region functions as an assembly platform for especially the Western European 
market, research and development have remained the core, which might, in the 
end, hinder substantial economic up-scaling of the region. At the same time, 
the post-socialist context adds a temporal flavour to the traditional mechanisms 
that we already know from the literature on other aspects of the semi-periphery.  
The suppression of the ECE domestic capitalist class during communism paved 
the way for massive privatization based on current hegemony of Anglo-Saxon 
ideas, which has led to a strong process of financialisation that strengthens 
intra-firm hierarchy. New technologies have entered the region but largely as a 
part of these intra-firm hierarchies, which subsequently reinforced the 
dependency of the region on transnational corporations for its economic 
development. 
A second merit instigated by the theoretical tradition in which this paper is 
grounded concerns the debate concerning the ongoing graduation of former 
semi-peripheral economies. It has generally been argued that the region would 
follow the same path as countries such as Ireland, leading them into the core of 
the world economy (Roncevic 2002, 13-14). The latter have been able to 
experience sustained economic growth in the context of a very prominent role 
of foreign MNCs. However, what the current crisis points out is that such a 
path can be deeply disturbed by economic developments in the core economies 
over which regional governments have no control. At the same time, many of 
the new EU member states lack the resources to actively counter some of the 
most pressing consequences of the crisis, probably also putting them in a 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the core economies when the worst of the 
crisis is over. Our understanding of this process is indeed enhanced when we 
take some of the repercussions of dependent development into account. 
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Processes of dependent development as Gereffi and Evans already pointed 
out are less crisis-proof than other paths of developments. Especially the fact 
that the semi-peripheral countries have only very limited control of their 
economic destiny makes them more prone to the intrinsic shocks of the world 
economy. The process of privatization as well as the consequential sale of these 
firms to transnational capital has rendered the semi-peripheral states without 
control over the commending heights of their economy (King and Sznajder 
2006, 790). The consequences of this are now becoming increasingly clear. 
At the same time, there are some issues that call for further explanation. The 
most pressing issue relates to the position of transnational banks in the region.  
For the moment it seems that they have lined up alongside the new member 
states in their call for a rescue plan for post-socialist Europe. Such a coalition is 
hard to account for from a traditional dependency perspective. The coalition 
between capital from the core and states from the semi-periphery are not 
uncommon from this perspective, but are always on an unequal footing and are 
almost always related to developments within the semi-periphery. However, 
the current coalition might well be considered an advocacy coalition aimed at 
moving states with the economic core. Despite the fact that the transnational 
banks in this coalition largely consist of marginal actors, in a global 
perspective, their role as an intrinsic element of the core of the world economy 
gives this phenomenon a dimension that calls for further explanation. 
Finally, the current crisis indicates some of the problematic long-term 
perspectives for the current model of economic development. It remains to be 
seen whether the current system will be able to maintain and reproduce itself.  
As World System Theory has pointed out, the semi-periphery is characterized 
as politically unstable regions, where political systems frequently show 
populist, if not authoritarian traits (Shannon 1996, 43). During the last decade 
we have already seen a rise of populism in countries such as Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia; and it might well be that the current crisis will strengthen these 
movements even further. Continuing research that pays particular attention to 
the key actors in the post-socialist Europe, including the comprador class that 
seems unaffected so far by the current developments, is necessary to establish 
stronger predictions in this respect. 
References 
Bair, Jennifer. 1995. Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, 
Going Forward. In Competition & Change 2: 153-180. 
Baran, Paul A. 1957. The Political Economy of Growth. London: Monthly Review 
Press. 
Berend, Iván T., and György Ránki. 1974. Economic Development in East-Central 
Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries. New York: Columbia University Press. 
BMI. Asia 1998 vs CEE 2009/2010: CEE Will Be Worse. 
 262
<http://www.fdi.net/bmi/bmidisplay.cfm?filename=OEMO_20090325_244219_xm
l.html> (accessed May 5, 2009). 
Bohle, Dorothee. 2004. The EU and Eastern Europe: Failing the test as a better 
power. In Socialist Register 2005: The empire reloaded, ed. Panitch, Leo, and 
Colin Leys, 301-312. London: The Merlin Press. 
Bohle, Dorothee, and Bela Greskovits. 2006. Capitalism without Compromise: 
Strong Business and Weak Labor in Eastern Europe’s New Transnational 
Industries. In Studies in Comparative International Development 41: 3-25. 
Bohle, Dorothee, and Bela Greskovits. 2007. Neoliberalism, Embedded Neo-
liberalism, and Neocorporatism: Towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-
Eastern Europe. In West European Politics 3: 443-466. 
Böröcz, Jozef. 1992. Dual dependency and property vacuum. Theory and Society 1: 
77-104. 
Böröcz, Jozef. 1999. From comprador state to auctioneer state. Property change, 
realignment, and peripheralization in post-state-socialist central and eastern 
Europe. In States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, ed. David A. Smith, 
Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, 93-209. London: Routledge. 
Böröcz, Jozef. 2004. Foreign Direct Legislation, Informality, and the Iron Fist of 
Liberal Capitalism. After the End of European State Socialism. Paper prepared 
for the inaugural workshop of ARCCGOR, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, December 17-18. 
Buiter, Willem. The return of capital controls. <http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009 
/02/the-return-of-capital-controls/> (accessed June 18, 2009). 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1975. The Effects of International Economic 
Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross-National Study. In 
American Sociological Review 6: 720-738. 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1998. Global Formation. Structures of the World 
Economy (updated version). Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 
Clancy, Michael. 1998. Commodity chains, services and development: theory and 
preliminary evidence from the tourism industry. In Review of International 
Political Economy 1: 122-148. 
Czaban, Laszlo, and Jeffrey Henderson. 1998. Globalization, institutional legacies 
and industrial transformation in Eastern Europe. In Economy and Society 27: 
585-613. 
Czaban, Laszlo, and Jeffrey Henderson. 2003. Commodity Chains, Foreign 
Investment and Labour Issues in Eastern Europe. In Global Networks 3: 171-196. 
Drahokoupil, Jan. 2008. The Investment-Promotion Machines: The Politics of 
Foreign Direct Investment Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe. In Europe-
Asia Studies 2: 197-225. 
Drahokoupil, Jan. 2009a. After Transition: Varieties of Political-Economic 
Development in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. In Comparative 
European Politics 2: 279-298. 
Drahokoupil, Jan. 2009b. Who Won the Contest for a New Property Class? 
Structural Transformation of Elites in the Visegrad Four Region. In Journal of 
East European Management Studies 4: 360-377. 
Eyal, Gil, Iván Selényi, and Eleanor Townsley. 1998. Making Capitalism Without 
Capitalists. The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe. London: Verso. 
 263
Frank, André Gunder. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin-America: 
historic studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Gereffi, Gary, and Peter Evans. 1981. Transnational Corporations, Dependent 
Development, and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil 
and Mexico. In Latin American Research Review 3: 31-64. 
Goldberg, Linda S. 2007. Financial Sector FDI and Host Countries: New and Old 
Lessons. In Economic Policy Review 1: 1-17. 
Greskovits, Bela. 2005. Leading Sectors and the Variety of Capitalism in Eastern 
Europe. In Actes du GERPISA 39: 113-128. 
Hanson, Gordon H. 2001. Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment. G-
24 Discussion Papers 9. Geneva: UNCTAD. 
Harvey, David. 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Holman, Otto. 2004. Integrating peripheral Europe: the different roads to ‘security 
and stability’ in Southern and Central Europe. In Journal of International 
Relations and Development 7: 208-236. 
Hudson, Ray. 2001. Regional development, flows of value and governance 
processes in an enlarged Europe, Working Paper 6. Durham: Department of 
Geography, Durham University. 
Hunya, Gábor. 2000. Central Europe Catching-up Through FDI? In Integration 
Through Foreign Direct Investment: Making Central European Industries 
Competitive, edited by Gábor Hunya, 8-27. Cheltenham and Northampton: 
Edward Elgar.  
Kay, Cristóbal, and André Gunder Frank. 2005. From the “Development of 
Underdevelopment” to the ‘World System’ In Development and Change 6: 1177-
1183. 
King, Lawrence P. 1999. The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: The Performance of 
Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary, Working Paper 277. New Haven: William 
Davidson Institute, Yale University.  
King, Lawrence P. 2007. Central European Capitalism in Comparative Perspective. 
In Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Comple-
mentarities in the European Economy, edited by Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes, 
and Mark Thatcher, 307-327. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
King, Lawrence P., and Aleksandra Sznajder. 2006. The State-Led Transition to 
Liberal Capitalism: Neoliberal, Organizational, World-Systems, and Social 
Structural Explanations of Poland’s Economic Success. In American Journal of 
Sociology 112: 751-801. 
Lange, Peter. 1985. Semiperiphery and core in the European context. In 
Semiperipheral Development, ed. Arrighi, Giovanni, 179-214. Beverly Hills: 
Sage. 
Merö, Katalin, and Marianna Endrész Valentinyi. 2003. The Role of Foreign Banks 
in Five Central and Eastern European Countries. Budapest: National Bank of 
Hungary. 
Mideuropa. Central and Eastern Europe: How is it impacted by the global financial 
crisis? <http://www.asmp.fr/fiches_academiciens/textacad/larosiere/2008_11_14 
_MIDEUROPA.pdf> (accessed May 7, 2009). 
 264
Nölke, Andreas, and Arjan Vliegenthart. 2009. Enlarging the Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central 
Europe. In World Politics 4: 670-702. 
Perry, James. 2009. Goodwill Hunting. Accounting and the Global Regulation of 
Economic Ideas. Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
Peschard, Karine. 2009. Rethinking the Semi-Periphery: Some Conceputal Issues. 
<http://www.ualberta.ca/GLOBALISM/pdf/semi-periphery.lnk.pdf> (accessed 
June 18, 2009). 
Pickles, John, Adrian Smith, Milan Bucěk, Poli Roukova, and Robert Begg. 2006. 
Upgrading, Changing Competitive Pressures, and Diverse Practices in the East 
and Central European Apparel Industry. In Environment and Planning 12: 2305-
24. 
Poulantzas, Nicos. 1973. On Social Classes. In New Left Review 2: 27-54.  
Radice, Hugo. 2009. Halfway to Paradise? Making Sense of the Semiperiphery. 
Ontario: Center for Critical Study of Global Power and Politics. Working paper 
09/3. 
Raiffeisen Research. 2008. CEE Banking Sector Report. Size matters… as deposits 
move into the spotlight. Vienna: RZB Group. 
Raviv, Or. 2008. Predatory Finance and the Financialization of the New European 
Periphery. In Power and Politics after Financial Crises, ed. Justin Robertson, 
168-185. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Rostow, Walt W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist 
Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shannon, Thomas R. 1996. An Introduction to the World-System Perspective. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Shields, Stuart. 2003. The ‘charge of the right brigade’: Transnational social forces 
and the neoliberal configuration of Poland’s transition In New Political Economy 
2: 225-244. 
Shields, Stuart. 2004. Global Restructuring and the Polish State: Transition, 
Transformation, or Transnationalisation.In Review of International Political 
Economy 11: 132-154. 
Sinn, Hans-Werner, and Alfons J. Weichenrieder. 1997. Foreign Direct Investment, 
Political Resentment and the Privatization Process in Eastern Europe. In 
Economic Policy 24: 178-210.  
Smith, Adrian. 1995. Regulation Theory, Strategies of Enterprise Integration and 
the Political Economy of Regional Economic Restructuring in Central and 
Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovakia. In Regional Studies 8: 761-772. 
Smith, Adrian, Al Rainnie, Mick Dunford, Jane Hardy, Ray Hudson, and David 
Sadler. 2002. Networks of value, commodities and regions: Reworking divisions 
of labour in macro-regional economies. In Progress in Human Geography 1: 41-
63. 
Stark, David, and Laszlo Bruszt. 1998. Postsocialist Pathways: transforming 
Politics and Property in East Central Europe. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Vliegenthart, Arjan, Henk. W. Overbeek. 2007. Corporate Governance Regulation 
in East Central Europe: The Role of Transnational Forces.” In The Political 
Economy of Corporate Governance Regulation, ed. Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, 
Andreas Nölke, and Henk W. Overbeek, 177-198. London: Routledge. 
 265
Vliegenthart, Arjan, and Henk Overbeek. 2008. Tax Reform in Neo-liberal Europe. 
East Central Europe as a Template for Deepening the Neo-Liberal European 
Integration Project? In Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European 
Governance. From Lisbon to Lisbon, ed. Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, Jan 
Drahokoupil, and Laura Horn, 143-162. Palgrave: MacMillan. 
Vliegenthart, Arjan, and Laura Horn. 2007. The Role of the EU in the 
(trans)formation of Corporate Governance Regulation in Central Eastern Europe- 
The case of the Czech Republic. In Competition & Change 2: 137-154. 
Vliegenthart, Arjan. 2009. Transnational Actors and Corporate Governance 
Regulation in Postsocialist Europe. Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1985. The Relevance of the Concept of Semi-Periphery to 
Southern Europe. In Semiperipheral Development, ed. Arrighi, Giovanni, 31-39. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2000. The Essential Wallerstein. New York: The New 
Press. 
Whitley, Richard. 1999. Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change 
of Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. 2009. EU10 Regular Economic Report. May 2009. 
Yin, Robert K. 1984.Case study research: Design and methods. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 
